This ruling by this California appellate court is an unpublished opinion, meaning it is only binding on the case which they ruled. Although the ruling is unpublished, it does illustrate the rules when suing the employer of an employee.

Members of the religion engage in field service, which involves preaching door-to-door and distributing religious literature. While performing field service, members don’t ask for donations, although they can accept them. The congregation was made up of elders, ministerial servants, pioneers, and publishers. The last were rank and file members. Pioneers were an appointed volunteer position with slightly more hours in preaching work than publishers. Watchtower was the publisher of the religion’s written materials and, prior to the Christian Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses overseeing the governing body, was the managing entity.

On the date of the collision, the driver and three female members of the Bancroft Congregation met with a plan to perform field service. They went to the territory where they would preach. Other congregation members were also doing field service. The driver drove to the neighborhood. At around 9:45, they started preaching. After 90 minutes, they were done for the day. They chatted for a while, and the driver offered to take the others to Burger King for lunch and drive them home afterward. While on their way to Burger King, the car collided with the bicyclist. They waited for a police officer and then went to eat.

The bike rider settled with the driver and then sued two Jehovah’s Witness entities: Watchtower Bible and Las Lomas Spanish Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses. He argued that the two entities were liable for the driver’s negligence under a theory of respondeat superior. Under this doctrine, a principal can be held liable for an agent’s negligence as long as the negligence happens in the course and scope of the agency. It is most often used in an employment context, whereby an employer is held liable for an employee’s negligence.

A third religious entity appeared by consent. Together, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The motion was granted on the grounds that the driver was not the defendant’s agent and that she wasn’t acting in the course and scope of agency at the time of the collision. The plaintiff appealed.

The appellate court explained that, even assuming there was an agency relationship, the driver in this case was acting outside the course and scope of her agency. A principal cannot be held liable for an agent’s negligence once the work is completed, except in certain circumstances. Under the going and coming rule, when an agent is traveling to or from the workplace, the agency relationship is suspended, and the agent’s actions are not conducted within the scope of agency as a matter of law. In this case, the accident happened after she was done working for the day.

The plaintiff argued that the case wasn’t barred by the going and coming rule because the driver’s actions came within the required vehicle exception. This exception applies when the use of a personal vehicle is an express or implied condition of working at a particular place.

The plaintiff relied on a wrongful death case in which a Catholic priest was temporarily living in California to serve the needs of Basque Catholics. While driving back to Fresno after ministering to a family in a nearby city, he crashed into another vehicle, resulting in the death of those in the other vehicle. The heirs won in a wrongful death suit against the Bishop, since the priest had been acting in the course and scope of his agency with the Bishop. His work on the date of the accident was of incidental benefit to the Bishop, and he had to use his car to accomplish the ministerial work.

The appellate court explained that in contrast to the wrongful death action, in this case, the driver’s vehicle wasn’t an express or an implied condition of doing field service, and most members of the congregation didn’t own a motor vehicle. The judgment was affirmed.

Whether you are bringing a lawsuit for injuries you’ve suffered or because you’ve lost a loved one in a wrongful death, it is important to retain an attorney that understands all possible theories of recovery. If you’ve suffered injuries or a loved one has died due to someone else’s negligence in Modesto, the Bogan Law Firm may be able to represent you in a personal injury lawsuit for damages. Contact us at (209) 565-3425 or via our online form.

Blog posts

Modesto Area Car Accident: Negligence to Blame for Death of a Child, January 12, 2014
Dog Bite Liability and Halloween, October 28, 2012

These numbers show us that more and more adults are riding bicycles than ever before. This is particularly true in urban areas such as Modesto, California, which boasts many impressive bicycle trails. In addition, the summertime brings upon more bicyclists which can lead to more fatalities or injuries.

If one is injured in a bicycle accident, what limitations are placed on an uninsured California bicyclist’s rights to recover damages, if he or she is hit by a car and severely injured? The calculation of damages can be complex, especially when an accident victim is an uninsured bicyclist who has not been able to pay his or her own substantial medical bills after a serious accident.

In Bermudez v. Ciolek, a bicyclist was struck in Fountain Valley, California (350 miles south of Modesto) by a car during a traffic light transition from green to red. A first driver going westbound began a left turn as a second driver traveling eastbound entered an intersection. The second driver’s car veered to the southeast corner of the intersection, striking Omar Bermudez, who was standing on the sidewalk astride his bicycle. At the time of the crash, Bermudez didn’t posses medical insurance.

The jury found both defendants had acted with negligence, but it concluded that only the westbound driver caused the bicyclist’s harm. The westbound driver was found 100% responsible for the $3,751,969 in damages.

On appeal, the driver argued this verdict was inconsistent because the jury did find the other driver negligent but didn’t assign him a percentage of fault. Alternatively, she claimed she was entitled to a new trial on damages because there was not enough evidence of the bicyclist’s reasonable medical damages. She faulted the bicyclist for relying on expenses already incurred and expert testimony, and she argued that the plaintiff’s experts needed to do more to show their testimony was based on the market value of the services.

The appellate court explained that multiple witnesses, including three accident reconstruction experts, testified at trial. The westbound driver was negligent due to factors such as the color of the light as she started to turn left, her attentiveness to traffic conditions before her, her reaction when observing the approaching vehicle, and the position of the vehicle at impact.

The appellate court reasoned that the jury credited evidence that tended to show she started her turn before the light turned red, but she wasn’t adequately monitoring the traffic approaching and then braked when she saw the eastbound driver, blocking the traffic lanes.

The appellate court also explained that eyewitnesses had offered different estimates of the eastbound driver’s speed. While the accident reconstruction experts all agreed that he was going 45-48 miles per hour, they agreed his stated speed of 50 mph fit. Only the westbound driver’s expert was of the opinion that the other driver was going more than 60 mph. In general, there was no showing at trial that the eastbound driver’s car wouldn’t have ricocheted into the bicyclist had he been going slower.

The court explained that the jurors had found the eastbound driver negligent but didn’t find it a substantial factor in causing the bicyclist harm. To understand this better, the elements of negligence are (1) duty, (2) breach of duty, (3) actual and proximate cause, and (4) damages. The jury found that the eastbound driver had a duty and breached that duty, but it didn’t find element 3, which is that the breach of duty caused the accident. Since all four elements must exist to hold a defendant responsible for negligence, the appellate court didn’t consider a finding that element 2 existed inconsistent with a finding that element 3 did not exist.

With regard to the amount of damages, the court noted the bicyclist had no medical insurance and sustained multiple injuries. The bicyclist testified the amount of his bills was about $450,000 and that he couldn’t pay any of his bills. Multiple experts testified as to the future medical treatment he would need in the future, and the costs.

The court explained that there is no bright line rule in case law on how to determine the reasonable value of medical bills that uninsured plaintiffs have incurred by not paying medical bills. However, the court concluded that, contrary to the defendant’s argument, the plaintiff’s uninsured status meant that the billed amounts were relevant to what he actually incurred, unlike insured plaintiffs who only really incur the lower amount negotiated by an insurer. These amounts were also relevant and admissible with regard to the reasonable value of his medical expenses.

The court also explained that damages for past medical expenses are the lesser of: (1) what has been paid or incurred for past medical expenses or (2) the reasonable value of the services. In this case, nobody had paid for the plaintiff’s medical expenses, so the operative measure of damages was the jury’s sense of the reasonable value of the services. The court found the jury’s award slightly too high and reduced it, but otherwise it affirmed the judgment.

When a car hits a bicyclist in California and elsewhere, the results can be catastrophic for the bicyclist, while the driver of the car walks away unscathed. If you’ve suffered a bicycle accident in Modesto, the Bogan Law Firm may be able to represent you in a lawsuit for damages. Contact us at (209) 565-3425 or via our online form.

Blog posts

Modesto Area Car Accident: Negligence to Blame for Death of a Child, January 12, 2014
Dog Bite Liability and Halloween, October 28, 2012